Arguing by Question: A Toulminian Reading of Cicero’s Account of the Enthymeme by Kraus, Manfred
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 6
Jun 1st, 9:00 AM - 5:00 PM
Arguing by Question: A Toulminian Reading of
Cicero’s Account of the Enthymeme
Manfred Kraus
Universität Tübingen
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been
accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please
contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Kraus, Manfred, "Arguing by Question: A Toulminian Reading of Cicero’s Account of the Enthymeme" (2005). OSSA Conference
Archive. 36.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA6/papers/36
Arguing by Question: A Toulminian Reading of Cicero’s Account of the 
Enthymeme 
 
MANFRED KRAUS 
 
Philologisches Seminar 
Universität Tübingen 
Wilhelmstraße 36 
D-72074 Tübingen 
Germany 
manfred.kraus@uni.tuebingen.de 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In his Topics (§§ 54-55) Cicero describes a type of argument which he calls enthymeme, but 
which he also refers to as the argument ex contrariis (from contraries or incompatibles). This 
kind of reasoning he states is formally based on the third type of syllogism of Stoic logic, which 
may be formalized as follows: ¬ (p 
^
 q); p → ¬ q (e.g. not both it is day and it is night; but it is 
day; therefore it is not night). Cicero, however, illustrates this argumentative pattern by way of 
several examples he quotes from Roman drama. By these examples it is made clear that the 
argument is never meant to be expressed in its full tripartite syllogistic form, but in much more 
condensed phrasing that usually appears in the linguistic form of a rhetorical question (e.g. “How 
can you condemn a person whom you accuse of nothing?”). 
In this abridged form, not all parts of the argument are explicitly stated. I will argue that, 
for this reason, the traditional model of syllogistic logic is insufficient for an appropriate analysis 
of this type of argument, but that Stephen Toulmin’s model of the structure of an argument has 
much better prospects to offer in this respect. 
When analysed according to Toulmin’s model, any argument of this kind turns out to be 
based on at least two implicit assumptions that serve as argumentative warrants. One of them is 
the formal validity of the syllogistic pattern, which may be granted off-hand. More essentially, 
however, the persuasiveness of the argument rests on the precondition that the claimed 
‘incompatibility’ it is based on be in fact acceptable to the audience. This, however, is usually the 
weak point of arguments of this type in practical use, as the kinds of incompatibilities they have 
to proceed from are generally neither proven facts nor logical truisms as in the standard examples 
of Stoic logic, but assessments that can at best be called probable and would need further 
backing. I will further argue that this is the very reason for the preferred phrasing of such 
arguments as rhetorical questions. For the form of the rhetorical question (“How can you …?”) 
puts strong psychological or moral pressure on the audience to make them accept without protest 
what is highly debatable, but vitally needed for the argument to work. 
Cicero explicitly states that this type of argument is as popular with philosophers as it is 
with orators, an assessment for which he offers ample proof both in his philosophical writings 
and in his speeches. By an analysis of a selection of examples of such arguments from both kinds 
of works I will show that the truth claims of the incompatibilities involved can generally be 
related to various standard topical arguments (such as analogies, e contrario, correlations, from- 
cause-to-effect, the argumentum a minore etc.), and that from these topics appropriate rebuttals 
for any such argument may be easily derived. 
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